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The UK offshore natural gas and oil industry has a long and successful history and 
has been said to represent the pride of UK engineering science. For over 30 years, 
the North Sea has provided the UK with a reliable and flexible source of gas that has 
greatly benefited the UK, but as gas reserves, and consequently production, decline 
the UK will rely increasingly on imports.  
Usually, equilibrium is the principal goal of economic analysis. Nevertheless, 
sometimes policy makers are interested not only in equilibrium predictions arising 
from traditional economic models but also in the trajectory taken by policy variables 
as these variables approach that equilibrium. System dynamics (SD) modelling 
approach has been extensively applied  for cases in which energy systems are in 
transition. Thus, the SD approach is in a good position to analyze systems which are 
in disequilibrium caused by structural shifts such as the decline in UK indigenous 
gas production.  
The SD approach is consistent with traditional economic modelling of dynamic 
phenomena, but employs different terminology and conventions. From a 
mathematical point of view, the relationships between system variables could be 
modelled using systems of ordinary differential equations. With advances in software 
technology, such models can be readily constructed and various alternative model 
specifications tested. We use the system dynamics (SD) approach to investigate the 
factors influencing the long-term rate of UK indigenous natural gas 
production and to determine the nature of system behaviour as well 
as to examine the effectiveness of various policies in softening the 
transition from self-sufficiency to gas import-dependence in the long-
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term. The key insights from our SD model are derived from the integration of 
econometric estimations, which yields numerical estimations of the trajectories of 
key policy variables, as well as any equilibria to which they might converge. 
In particular, we found that supply-side policy alone cannot substantially postpone 
the discovery, production and consumption peaks. One might expect that a low 
taxation policy would encourage more exploration and production of gas and thereby 
stimulate higher consumption rates.  Instead, there was no overall net effect on 
production and consumption in the long term. The depletion effect on the cost of 
exploration acts as a counterbalance to low taxation policy. Depletion translates into 
rising costs and prices, which depresses consumption. The advances in exploration 
and production technology can delay the peak of exploration, production and 
consumption. Technological improvements mean lower cost of exploration and 
production which exert downward pressure on the long-term pattern of price 
dynamics. We also found that the dynamics of the main variables, namely, 
exploration, production and consumption, are sensitive to initial demand conditions. 
Postponing the onset of natural gas price increases can therefore be achieved more 
effectively through efforts to reduce demand growth. Analysis of alternative policies 
indicates that the most effective policies for prolonging indigenous gas production 
and consumption are those that combines both supply and demand side measures. 
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We present a dynamic model of the indigenous natural gas industry in 
the UK. The model has been built using a system dynamics approach. 
Using the model several scenarios have been analysed. We found that 
management of the supply-side policy alone cannot substantially 
postpone the discovery, production and consumption peak. We also 
found that the dynamics of the main variables, namely, exploration, 
production and consumption, are sensitive to initial demand conditions. 
Postponing the onset of gas price increases can therefore be achieved 
more effectively through efforts to reduce demand growth. One might 
expect that a low taxation policy would encourage more exploration and 
production of gas and thereby stimulate higher consumption rates.  
Instead, there was no overall net effect on production and consumption 
in the long term. The depletion effect on cost of exploration acts as 
counterbalance to low taxation policy. Depletion effect causes cost and 
thus price to rise further which depress consumption rate. The advances 
in exploration and production technology can delay the peak of 
exploration, production and consumption. Technological improvements 
mean lower cost of exploration and production which pressure down 
long-term pattern of price dynamics.      
Keywords System Dynamics; Simulation Modelling; natural 
gas; energy policy; long-term policy 
analysis;      
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1. Introduction 
The UK offshore natural gas and oil industry has a long and successful history and has been said to 
represent the pride of UK engineering science (Wright, 2006). For over 30 years, the North Sea has 
provided the UK with a reliable and flexible source of gas that has greatly benefited the UK, but as gas 
reserves, and consequently production, decline the UK will rely increasingly on imports (DTI, 2006a).  
Usually equilibrium is the principal goal of economic analysis. Nevertheless, sometimes policy 
makers are interested not only in equilibrium predictions arising from traditional economic models but 
also in the trajectory taken by policy variables as these variables approach that equilibrium. As will be 
shown later in the literature review, most system dynamics (SD) energy models have been applied in 
cases where energy systems are in transition. Thus, we take the view that SD approach is in a good 
position to analyze systems which are in disequilibrium caused by structural shifts such as a decline in 
UK indigenous gas production.  
The SD approach is consistent with traditional economic modelling of dynamic phenomena, but 
employs different terminology and conventions. The primary focus of the SD approach is on the feedback 
structure of the system under analysis. The representation of the feedback structure is usually done using 
causal loop diagrams (CLD). The feedback could be either balancing, which capture negative feedback, 
or reinforcing, which captures positive feedback. A balancing feedback exhibits goal-seeking behaviour, 
under which the system seeks to return to equilibrium after a disturbance occurred in the system. Such 
behaviour conforms to the economic description of a stable equilibrium. By contrast, a reinforcing loop 
(negative feedback) represents a situation when an initial disturbance leads to further changes in the 
system. This kind of systems behaviour suggests the presence of an unstable equilibrium. 
The systems structure is formalised using a simulation model consisting of a network of two 
elements: stocks and flows. The inertia of the system is captured by the stocks. Stocks either accumulate 
or deplete gradually. The rate of changes in stocks is regulated by stocks’ in- and out-flows. Stocks can be 
both tangible (e.g. proven gas reserves) and intangible (e.g. perceptions) concepts. The flow rates depend 
on various factors such as level of stocks in the system or exogenous parameters. These flow rates can be 
interpreted, for example, as output or input of policies, i.e. a decision making process. For example, in our 
paper, stock represents proven gas reserves and in-flow of that stock is discovery rate of natural gas while 
out-flow is gas production rate. 
From mathematical point of view, the relationships between systems’ variables could be modelled 
using systems of ordinary or differential equations. With the advancements in software technology such 
models could be readily constructed and various alternative model specifications could be tested. In 
particular, using system dynamics (SD) approach we investigate the factors influencing the long-term rate 
of UK indigenous natural gas production and to determine the nature of system behaviour as well as 
examining the effectiveness of various policies in softening the transition from self-sufficiency to gas 
import-dependence in the long-term. Furthermore every assumption regarding functional relationships 
between variables of our model was verified using econometric analysis. The key insight from our SD 
model with integration of econometric estimations is that the model yields numerical estimations of the 
trajectories of key policy variables, as well as any equilibrium to which they might converge. 
The paper is organised as follows: in the next section the state of the literature on SD energy 
modelling is reviewed. Section 3 introduces the model assumptions. Section 4 presents the model’s 
structure and its general description. In section 5, the dynamic behaviour of the model and its validation 
can be found. Section 6 presents the results of alternative scenarios and section 7 discusses the major 
conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis. 
 
2. State of the Literature 
The application of system dynamics modelling to energy resources began in 1970s. One of the first 
extensive SD energy models, COAL2, was developed for the U.S. government (Naill 1977; 1992; Naill et 
al. 1992). The COAL2 model served as a basis for another large-scale SD energy model, FOSSIL2, which 
has played an important role in U.S. energy planning since the late 1970s. Apart from these two extensive 
models, the SD approach has been applied to other issues related to the US energy system, such as 
conservation (Ford and Bull 1989), policy evaluation (Ford 1983), investment and uncertainty (Ford 
1985), and power plant construction cycles in the competitive US electricity market (Ford 1999). In the 
early 2000s, Ford (2000) applied the SD approach to construct a model for the California Energy 
Commission that explored patterns of power plant construction that could arise from different theories of 
investor behaviour. Other large scale SD energy models include Sterman’s (1983) model of energy-
economy interactions, the Geraghty and Lyneis (1985) model which assessed the effects of external 
agents on utility performance, and the Davidsen et al. (1990) model of the petroleum life-cycle. 
Outside the U.S., SD energy models have been developed for the European energy industry 
including a model of inter-fuel substitution applied to OECD countries (Moxness 1990). An application 
of an SD energy model for France was done by Roche (1989). SD modelling approach of the energy 
sector has also applied to other countries including: Argentina (Rego, 1989), Colombia (Dyner, Smith and 
Pena, 1993), India (Chowdhurg and Sahu, 1992), and New Zealand (Bodger and May, 1992). 
For the UK energy system specifically, numerous SD models were developed during the 1980s and 
1990s. For example, a series of SD energy models were developed to investigate the issues related to 
privatisation of UK gas and electricity industries (Bunn and Larsen 1992; 1994; Bunn, Larsen and Vlakos 
1993). In the late 1990s, another SD energy model was built to analyze the market power of dominant 
players in UK gas and electricity market (Bunn, Dyner and Larsen 1997). 
The model used in this paper builds on Naill (1973) and Sterman et al. (1983). However, our model 
has substantially broadened the representation of the gas industry beyond that found in Naill’s model 
(1973). In particular, we have tried to tackle some of the limitations which, in our opinion, made Naill’s 
model (1973) a less realistic representation for the specific case of indigenous UK gas production. 
Firstly, the structure of Naill’s model (1973) implies that production rate equals usage rate, 
modified by price. We find this assumption to be unrealistic in our case and therefore we explicitly model 
the production process. 
Secondly, Naill (1973) modelled the potential demand exogenously assuming a constant growth 
rate. We take an approach similar to Sterman et al. (1983), and model the gas demand through 
substitution effects on one side and exogenous growth of total primary energy demand on the other side. 
Thirdly, Naill (1973) did not model inter-fuel substitution which is an important issue for long-term 
energy modelling. Naill (1973) suggested that the assumption of independence, particularly between oil 
and gas, could affect the specific behaviour of the model in the early stages of gas discovery but would 
not affect overall model behaviour. The justification given for ignoring the oil and gas interdependency 
was that at that time in the U.S. over 70% of all gas wells were unassociated with oil (Adelman, 1962). 
Sterman et al. (1983) did include substitution between gas and oil in their model and we follow approach 
and model inter-fuel substitution explicitly.  
Lastly, both Naill (1973) and Sterman et al. (1983) have pointed out that the outcome of investment 
in exploration is generally not known for perhaps four to five years because of the need to wait for the 
results of site drilling, accurate resource estimation, etc. Therefore gas producers must inevitably base 
their exploration-related investment decisions on demand and price projections. However in Naill’s model 
(1973), the determinant of discovery rate is production or usage rate, which represents the current rather 
than the projected rates. Accordingly, the exploration-related investment decisions in our model are based 
on information about future demand. 
 
2. Model assumptions 
Since we are interested in overall system behaviour the model assumes that the UK gas industry has 
only one firm exploring and producing an undifferentiated product, natural gas. This assumption is 
similar to that used by Naill (1973) and by Sterman et al. (1983).  
The model has a uniform price for natural gas driven by supply-demand conditions, but we will 
focus here specifically on the wholesale price. By the average wholesale price we mean average wellhead 
price plus the costs of conveying to the UK beach and the costs of treatment. In reality, there is no single 
price for natural gas and the gas price issue is very complicated (Wright, 2006). We are not conducting a 
detailed investigation into the nature of different gas prices so when we discuss gas price we mean the 
average wholesale price, which roughly corresponds to the UK OTC wholesale price. The use of the 
wholesale price as the proxy for the commodity gas price in the UK might be justified since Wright 
(2006) found that there are significant positive correlations in gas prices in the UK. 
The model does not consider potential effects of imports or exports on system behaviours. Also the 
model does not explicitly model technological improvements in exploration or production. However the 
effects of technological improvements can be analyzed in our model by assuming that unit costs of 
exploration and production fall over time. 
 
3. Model structure and general description 
The model consists of three main parts, namely exploration sector, production and consumption 
sector, demand and substitution sector. 
 
3.1 Exploration sector 
The exploration sector is mainly represented by three negative feedback (balancing) loops (for 
details of main loops and their variables see appendix A). These loops represent the relationships between 
discovery rate, costs, investment and demand (Figure 1). 
Undiscovered reserves (UR) is the total volume of natural gas expected to be found in the future 
that is not due to growth of existing fields. It assumes current discovery technologies and is not 
necessarily economically exploited (USNPC, 2003). We follow Hubbert’s (1956) assumption that the 
amount of fossil fuels, in our case natural gas, is finite. This assumption is more accurate for a well-
explored mature basin such as the UK sector of the North Sea. Proved reserves (PR) are defined as those 
reserves that have a high confidence of being produced, and by implication, that are already economic. 
The data for UR and PR were derived from the UK Department of Trade and Industry’s annual Energy 
Reports 1998-2001 (The “Brown Book”) (DTI, 2007) and the UK energy sector indicators 2006 (DTI, 
2006b). 
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Figure 1: Causal loop diagram of Exploration sector 
 
The key assumption here is that a fall in the fraction of undiscovered reserves remaining (FURR) 
will cause the cost of exploration and appraisal (COE&A) drilling to increase. To test this assumption a 
regression was performed on 1987-1998 data for COE&A drilling and FURR. The result of regression is 
reported in appendix B. A functional relationship as indicated by (B.1) could be represented through a 
multiplier (COE&AM) as in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between FURR and COE&AM 
 
The relationship reflects the fact that there are diminishing marginal returns from a gas field. The 
fact that when variable FURR approaches the value of 0.7 the multiplier COE&AM tend to infinity 
reflects UK’s rapid depletion policy of oil and gas resources of UKCS. 
The data for COE&A drilling is difficult to obtain because of the allocation problem between oil 
and gas exploration and appraisal (E&A) drilling. The DTI “Brown Book” (DTI, 2007) reported the data 
on capital investment which included the total cost of exploration and appraisal drilling for oil and gas 
wells. To derive the cost of gas E&A drilling alone we have calculated the share of successfully drilled 
gas wells against oil wells. This share gave us an approximation of investment that went on gas E&A. 
The methodology for calculating COE&A employed in this study is similar to that of Naill (1973). 
Consequently, the annual amount of gas discoveries (Indicated discovery rate or ‘IDR’) is defined as 
industry’s total investment in E&A drilling divided by the COE&A in GBP per cubic meter of gas 
discovered (appendix B, eqn. B.4). 
We model the discovery rate (B.5) with a lag of 4.5 years which is the leadtime between initial date 
of investment in E&A drilling and commencement of field development. For example Kemp and Kasim 
(2003) using extensive econometric model of UKCS oil and gas activities obtained a result of 1.8 year 
between gas discoveries and field development. It should be noted that the value of 1.8 year obtained by 
Kemp and Kasim (2003) might be underestimated as the authors themselves noted that: “...higher 
average leadtime are to be expected when the investment dates of other discoveries are determined” 
(Kemp and Kasim, 2003). The delay value of 4.5 years is also consistent with early estimates from 
Khazoom (1971) who derived the value on the basis of regression analysis of the response of gas 
discoveries to changes in gas price. His results suggest that the delay between E&A investments and 
actual discoveries is 4.5 years. 
Industry’s total investment in new exploration activities is assumed to be proportional to its sales 
revenue. During the industry’s growth phase this enables its further expansion through higher rate of 
investment in new gas discoveries. Like any type of investment decision, the decision to invest in E&A 
depends on industry’s return on investment (ROI, loop B2) and the relative reserve-demand ratio (RRDR, 
loop B3). This assumption is consistent with results yielded from regressions (equations B.6 and B.7 in 
appendix B) performed on data for industry’s ROI, RRDR and percentage of sales invested in E&A 
(PSIE&A). 
Regression results (eqn. B.6 in appendix B) show that the relationship between PSIE&A and 
RRDR is negative. Producers will invest in exploration of new fields only if they expect that demand 
would exceed some ‘normal’ level. If the RDR falls below the ‘normal’ level, which is assumed to be 10 
years in our model (based on industry’s historical data taken from (BP, 2007) producers will invest more 
to satisfy growing demand. By contrast, a fall in projected demand would cause RDR to exceed the 
desired level, which in turn discourages investment.  
Regressions performed on ROI and PSIE&A data (eqn. B.7 in appendix B) yielded a positive 
coefficient, which verifies our assumption that investment in E&A is driven by dynamics of ROI as well. 
To incorporate these findings in our model, PSIE&A has been modelled as the product of the ROI Factor 
and RRDR Factor (Figure 3 and 4). RRDRF and ROIF curves were derived from (B.6) and (B.7). 
 
Figure 3: ROI versus ROI Factor 
 
Figure 4: RRDR versus RRDR Factor 
 
These two mechanisms (figures 3 and 4) imply that investment in E&A will be encouraged when 
(i) the proved reserves are not anticipated to be large enough to cover projected demand and (ii) ROI is 
high enough; by contrast, these mechanisms discourage investment when (i) proved reserves are much 
larger than projected demand or (ii) ROI is relatively low. 
 
3.2 Production and consumption sector 
The production rate is determined by two main forces: (i) industry’s willingness to invest in 
production (loop B4); and (ii) the consumption rate (loop B5) (see figure 5). Basically, the loop B4 
represents the supply side (production side). The consumption rate is determined by the price of natural 
gas and demand (loop B5). 
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Figure 5: Causal Loop diagram of production and consumption sector 
 
The loop B4 shows that an increase in production rate causes the relative reserve-production ratio 
(RRPR) to rise and an increase in RRPR causes the Production Unit Cost (PUC) to rise. A rise in the PUC 
will ensure that the production rate will be lower than it otherwise would have been. 
The main assumption of the loop B4 is that when RPR exceeds its “normal” value, the PUC tends 
to increase. The production rate from a reservoir can be increased by drilling additional production wells, 
but well numbers are limited by their cost compared with the extra flow rate (Posner et al. 1981). Another 
limitation on useful investment in producing wells is the well density i.e. there can be technological limits 
to the number of producing wells that can be installed for a given field (Sterman et al. 1983). The NRPR 
is assumed to be 12 years, which corresponds to the industry average (Posner et al. 1981). Therefore, as 
production rate increases and proved reserves are depleted, the RPR approaches its normal value, in order 
to extract more gas additional wells and other facilities will need to be installed. The functional 
relationship between the depletion of gas reserves and PUC was obtained using a regression analysis. 
Equations (B.12-B.14) in appendix B highlight regression results.  
Based on the results of (B.12 in appendix B) the Production Cost Factor (PCF) curve was derived 
by normalising its value to 1.0 at the 1987 level of RRDR (1.22). The PCF curve versus RRPR is 
represented in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: RRPR versus PC Factor 
 
As in the case for E&A investment (loop B2), the model assumes that the percentage of sales 
revenue invested in production (PSIP) depends on the dynamics of industry’s ROI. This assumption is 
verified against the results of the regression (eqn. B.15 in appendix B) performed on data for operating 
expenditures plus other costs related to production expansion and actual ROI (DTI, 2007). 
The relationship between ROI and PSIP Factor (PSIPF) is shown in Figure 7. The PSIPF curve was 
derived from (B.15) by normalising its value to 1.0 at 1987 levels (168% ROI). 
 
Figure 7: ROI versus PSIPF 
 
The impact of producers’ willingness to expand gas production on the actual production rate is seen 
in the variable, Desired Production Rate (DPR). This variable represents the producers’ desired annual 
output based on information regarding ROI. The calculation of DPR is shown in (B.16) and (B.17).  
The relationships between reserves, price, consumption and production rate are represented through 
loop B5. The loop works in the following way: an increase in the production rate depresses proved 
reserves, which in turn leads to a decrease in RRDR. The decrease in RRDR causes the gas price to rise, 
which in turn decreases the consumption rate. As a result, the production rate will be lower than it 
otherwise would have been. The main assumptions of this loop are: (i) the gas price is determined through 
the variable RRDR and (ii) gas consumption is price sensitive.  
The assumption that the price depends on projected demand and availability of gas reserves is 
consistent with the results of the ILEX report on gas prices in the UK (ILEX, 2004). ILEX (2004) 
reported that apart from linkages to oil price, gas prices in the UK are driven by demand-supply balancing 
as well as market sentiment (expectations of market players about future demand/supply). To check the 
assumption a regression was performed on data for gas price and variable RRDR (Earp, 2007; DTI, 2007). 
The result of the regression (eqn. B.18 in appendix B) confirms our assumption. 
So in our model, the average wholesale price (AWP) of natural gas is determined to be a product of 
the total unit cost (TUC) and the price factor (PF) which is influenced by the RRDR dynamics (Figure 8). 
PF curve was derived from (B.18). Formally, the price (AWP) is defined as indicated in (B.19-B.21). 
 
Figure 8: RRDR versus PF 
 
The assumption that gas consumption is price sensitive is supported by analysis of long-term 
electricity consumption and prices in the UK (Figure 9). In 2005, natural gas contributed 29% of 
electricity generation in the UK (DTI, 2007); thus, if the gas price increased electricity generators would 
be expected to switch to other fuels (e.g. coal). In 2004, coal prices rose relative to gas prices which led to 
a reduction in the amount of coal consumed. Similarly, the large increases in gas prices in 2005 and 2006 
meant that more coal was used for generation than gas (BERR, 2007a).  
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Figure 9: Electricity price and consumption in the UK 1970-2005* 
 
This assumption is validated by results of regression performed on data for average gas price and 
consumption rate in UK in the period 1987-2005. The result of this regression analysis is reported in the 
appendix B (eqn. B.22). The regression (eqn. B.22) finds a negative price coefficient and that there is a 
significant relationship, therefore, we can assume that natural gas consumption is price sensitive. The 
relationship between gas price and actual consumption can be represented through the Consumption 
Factor (CF) (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: AWP versus CF 
 
The CF curve was derived from (B.22) by normalising its value to 1.0 at an average gas price of 
0.075 GBP/cubic meter (the gas price in 2004). The consumption rate (CR) is computed as indicated by 
(B.23).  
                                                 
* Personal calculations based on (DTI, 2006b; Earp, 2007) 
Finally, in the production-consumption sector, production should be linked with the actual 
consumption. Based on information about the actual consumption rate, producers regulate their 
production capacity in order for their production rate to equal the actual consumption rate. Formally, 
production rate is computed as in (B.24). 
The combined logic of all the feedback loops (B4 and B5) in the production-consumption sector is 
that producer willingness to invest in production is driven by industry’s ROI and the actual consumption 
rate, which is driven by price dynamics. 
 
3.3 Demand projection and substitution sector 
The demand and substitution sector has only one balancing loop, B6 (figure 11). The loop works as 
follows: an increase in gas demand causes gas price to increase through RRDR. The increase in gas price 
leads to a rise in the share of other fuels in total primary energy demand (TPED). The increase in the 
share of other fuels in TPED closes the loop and ensures that the natural gas demand will be lower than it 
otherwise would have been. 
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Figure 11: Causal loop diagram of demand projection and substitution sector 
 
From the demand side we have introduced the substitution effect between natural gas and its main 
competitor fuels in TPED, i.e. coal, oil, nuclear, hydro. We assumed that coal, oil, nuclear and hydro 
shares in TPED are a function of gas price and time which represents other unaccounted factors 
determining the dynamics of energy demand. To check these assumptions the regressions were performed 
on 1976-2005 data for average gas price, coal, oil, nuclear and hydro energy demand (Earp, 2007; DTI 
2006b). The regression results are reported in appendix B (eqn. B.25-B.28). 
Regression results for coal, oil and nuclear were all significant (eqn. B.25-B.27), whereas the 
relationship between hydro share (HS) in TPED and gas price dynamics were not (B.28), hence we 
excluded the hydro relationship from further analysis of gas substitution factors. Except for the oil share 
equation (B.26) all price coefficients have a positive sign, which indicates that an increase in gas price 
would cause demand for the other fuels to rise.  
The regression for oil share (eqn. B.26) yielded a negative price coefficient and is relatively 
inelastic. This suggests that an increase in gas price would reduce demand for oil. This is due to the co-
movement of oil and gas prices in UK. As mentioned earlier, the supply of associated gas in the UK has 
been growing and in 2004 reached about 55% of total landed UKCS gas production (Wright, 2006). 
Secondly, due to the opening of the UK-Belgium Interconnector in October 1998 UK gas prices are partly 
influenced by European continental gas prices which are indexed to oil and oil-products (ILEX, 2004). 
Thirdly, Panagiotidis et al. (2004) analyzed UK oil and gas prices between 1996 and 2003 and found that 
they are cointegrated, i.e. move together over the longer-term (Panagiotidis et al., 2004).  
Usually when oil price is high, producers tend to increase oil production by maintaining high 
pressure in the wells by keeping associated gas underground, thus reducing gas supply which logically 
leads to an increase in gas price. But high oil prices would, on net, cause its share in TPED to decrease 
and therefore it is incorrect to infer that high gas price would lead to a decrease in the oil share of TPED. 
Since the causality between gas price and oil demand cannot be robustly inferred from empirical data, we 
excluded the relationship between oil demand and gas price from further analysis of gas substitution 
factors.  
The substitution factors shown in figure 12 were derived from eqn. B.25 and B.26 (appendix B) by 
normalising their value to 1.0 at an average gas price of 0.044GBP/cubic meter (gas price in 1987). The 
Oil and Hydro shares in TPED are assumed to be exogenously determined. The calculation of gas demand 
is shown in appendix B (eqn. B.29-B.35). 
 
Figure 12: AWP versus substitution factors 
 
4. Dynamic behaviour and validation of the model 
The model results correspond relatively well to general trends for real-world data, particularly for 
consumption rate, cumulative gas production, share of fuels in TPED and others (see figure 13-16). 
 
  
Figure 13: Consumption rate: simulated vs. real 
data 
Figure 14: Cumulative gas production: 
simulated vs. real data 
  
Figure 15: Shares of coal and gas in TPED: 
simulated vs. real data 
Figure 16: Shares of nuclear in TPED: 
simulated vs. real data 
 
Some variables are generally consistent with historical data (e.g. cumulative gas production) while 
others diverge for part of the time series (e.g. consumption rate). One reason for the discrepancy in the 
trend (particularly in the period after 2000 for nuclear share and consumption) is that our model does not 
account for imported gas, leading gas prices to be somewhat higher in the model. Another reason might 
be that two or more variables are interdependent as result of the feedback loops in our model. Where 
simultaneity is present, the literature on regression warns that the use of OLS regression methods can give 
biased estimates of the regression coefficients (Jonhston, 1997). The non-linear relationship in our model 
which was derived from OLS regressions may therefore be different from the actual real-world 
relationship. Therefore we must be aware of the results of OLS regressions in a system with feedback-
loop structure. 
 The feedback structure of our model may introduce biases in the relationships that we have 
derived from OLS regressions on historical data. If there are biases in the results produced by our model 
than an important objective is at least to measure and report those biases. The bias can be measured by 
analysing synthetic data (i.e., data from our model) and comparing them with historical data. The 
difference between the coefficients inferred statistically from the simulation of the synthetic data and that 
of real-world time series gives an approximate measure of the bias. Thus, simulation provides a method to 
check the validity of assumptions made when applying linear regression methods to System Dynamics 
models. This estimation procedure was applied to the table functions of our model (the factor and 
multiplier curves in our model) and the results are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of regressions on real and synthetic data 
Table functions OLS regressions on historical data OLS regressions on synthetic data 
COE&A Multiplier ( & ) 21.66 ( ) 4.5Ln COE A Ln FURR= − −  
R2=.731; SER=.44          (4.4)      (0.26) 
( & ) 21.95 ( ) 4.33Ln COE A Ln FURR= − −
R2=.99; SER=.06       (0.1)             (0.02) 
ROI Factor ( & ) 0.68 ( ) 1.2Ln PSIE A Ln ROI= −  
R2=.96; SER=.04     (0.1)      (0.05) 
 ( & ) 0.686 ( ) 1.19Ln PSIE A Ln ROI= −  
R2=.99 ;SER=.001     (0.001)   (0.00012) 
RRDR Factor  ( & ) 1.04 ( ) 0.95Ln PSIE A Ln RRDR= − −
R2=.97; SER=.036     (0.14)       (0.019) 
( & ) 0.99 ( ) 1.4Ln PSIE A Ln RRDR= − −  
 R2=.92; SER=.12     (0.075)       (0.055) 
PC Factor 
 
( ) 0.28 1.56 ( )Ln PC Ln RRPR= −  
R2=.92;    (0.036)          (0.134) 
SER=.11 
 ( ) 0.38 1.52 ( )Ln PC Ln RRPR= −  
R2=.99;    (0.019)          (0.015) 
SER=.09 
PSIP Factor ( ) 0.88 ( ) 1.098Ln PSIP Ln ROI= −  
                      (0.24)            (0.15) 
R2=.82           SER=.1 
( ) 0.82 ( ) 1.13Ln PSIP Ln ROI= −  
                      (0.0004)       (0.0001) 
R2=.99; SER=.001 
Price Factor ( ) 0.11 2.03 ( )Ln P Ln RRDR= −  
R2=.9;   (0.03)         (0.34) 
SER=.08 
( ) 0.83 2.01 ( )Ln P Ln RRDR= −  
R2=.99;  (0.005)         (0.01) 
SER=.02 
Consumption 
Factor 
 
( ) 2.56 0.42 ( ) 0.054( )Ln C Ln P t= − +  
             (0.41)    (0.13)     (0.004) 
R2=.945           SER=.063 
( ) 2.9 0.46 ( ) 0.06( )Ln C Ln P t= − +  
             (0.28)    (0.07)     (0.009) 
R2=.96           SER=.18 
Coal substitution 
Factor 
( ) 0.206 ( ) 0.046( ) 0.001Ln CS Ln P t= − −  
               (0.049)        (0.004)   (0.21) 
               R2=.917           SER=.089 
( ) 0.206 ( ) 0.046( ) 0.054Ln CS Ln P t= − −  
               (0.002)        (0.0003)   (0.008) 
               R2=.99           SER=.002 
Nuclear 
substitution Factor 
( ) 0.227 ( ) 0.017( ) 2.19Ln NS Ln P t= + −  
              (0.069)          (0.005)   (0.3) 
   R2=.845           SER=.12 
( ) 0.226 ( ) 0.017( ) 2.07Ln NS Ln P t= + −  
              (0.003)          (0.001)   (0.014) 
   R2=.99           SER=.004 
 
Figure 17 and 18 show the behaviour of the UK model of indigenous gas production under the Base 
case assumptions (i.e., the model is simulated using actual UK gas industry data). The production rate 
peaked in 2000. The production rate is constrained by proved reserves, actual consumption, and 
investment potential. As proved reserves begin to fall, the production rate follows this trend.  
The AWP remains low until the variable RDR falls below 20 years (figure 18). The expectation of 
a future reserves deficit based on demand projections causes the price to go up, signalling that additional 
discoveries are required. For example, during 2001-2008, industry responded to high prices by tapping 
additional discoveries (figure 17). DR stayed at a low level thereafter (figure 17) since a further decrease 
in RDR causes AWP to rise, which depresses consumption and production. In reality, consumption will 
continue to rise because gas imports will balance out increasing prices for indigenous UK gas. 
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Figure 17: Behaviour of DR, PRR, UR and PR in Base case* 
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Figure 18: Behaviour of AWP, RDR and CR in Base case† 
 
                                                 
* Discovery and  production rate are measured in cubic meters/year (cm/year) so the y-axis for them begins with 0 till 100 B 
(Billion) cm/year; Undiscovered and Proved reserves are measured in cubic meter (cm) so the y-axis for them begins with 0 up 
to 2.5 Bcm. 
† Price is measured as GBP/cubic meter (J/cm) so the Y-axis runs from 0 through 40 J/cm; Reserve-demand ratio is measured 
in years so the Y-axis is 0 up to 40 years; and consumption rate is measured in cubic meters/year (cm/year), so the scale of its 
Y-axis is 0 to 100 BCM. 
5. Analysis of alternative scenarios 
The success in matching historical data does not ensure the reliability of forecasts... As Sterman 
(2000) notes: “…the ability of the model to replicate historical data does not, by itself, indicate that the 
model is useful”. In this section we develop a range of scenarios to examine model behaviour across 
various possible futures. These scenarios do not represent any particular government policies existing 
now or in the past. Rather, they are answers to ‘what if’ questions and represent a range of possible 
policies in a declining gas production industry. Since the model was calibrated using 1987 industry data 
(the earliest possible year where all data required for our model was available). The alternative scenarios 
will be introduced at the beginning of the model run. 
The objective of the model is to examine various policies which could affect the development of 
the UK gas industry. For example, using the model we compare various taxation policies and 
technological development scenarios. We also check how the model behaves in extreme demand cases. 
The assumptions of growth rate of gas demand scenarios should be regarded as extreme values rather than 
real demand projection. So to analyse these issues we consider cases with the following assumptions: 
1. Low taxation policy (both Royalty and Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) are 0%)* 
2. High taxation policy (Royalty is 20%, PRT is 70%) 
3. High demand projection – 7% growth per year (compared to 3.5% p.a. in the Base case)† 
4. Low demand projection – 1% growth per year  
5. Advanced exploration and recovery technologies – we assume that with advanced technologies 
the unit cost of exploration and production would decline at 5.33% per year‡. 
 
5.1 Taxation policy cases 
In general taxation policy (TP) cases have the strongest impact on discovery rate. As was discussed 
earlier discovery rate (DR) is affected by two factors – industry’s ROI and future demand. Since taxation 
policy has a direct influence on industry’s returns, higher taxation policy, ceteris paribus, decreases 
industry’s returns and hence its investment in E&A (loop B2). In the low taxation case (LTC), initial 
value of DR is 33% higher than in the Base case due to higher ROI which directly affects E&A 
investment (see table 2). Due to anticipated demand growth, DR in both cases (LTC and High taxation 
cases (HTC) rises in the period 2000-2006. The turning points of DR are the same in all three cases 
(figure 19).  
 
                                                 
* Real taxation policy for UK indigenous oil and gas production as of May 2007 is as follows: Royalty is 12.5% for all fields 
which were developed before 1982, after that time Royalty is 0%; PRT is 50% for all fields which were developed before 1993 
after that time PRT is 0% (BERR, 2007b) 
† The growth rates for the demand cases were based on historical trends in UK natural gas consumption from 1965-2005, 
which varies considerably over the time horizon. In the initial period of introduction of gas usage in UK 1965-1974 average 
annual growth rate was 48%; in the period 1975-1984 average growth rate was 3.31%; in the period 1985-1995 average growth 
rate was 3%; in the period 1996-2005 average growth rate was 1.7% (authors’ calculations based on DTI, 2006b). 
‡ A 5.33% p.a. reduction in cost of exploration resulting from technological advancements was taken from (IEA, 2005).   
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Figure 19: Dynamics of DR in alternative cases 
In general, HTC discourages discovery of gas in the short-term and the initial value of DR is 13% 
less than that of Base case. The LTC might be expected to encourage more discoveries, but the 
cumulative gas discovery for this case is actually 0.2% lower than that of Base case. In the HTC, the 
cumulative gas discovery is about 1.8% less in value than that of Base case. These results suggest that TP 
cases are most efficient in the short-term and their relative effectiveness in the long run do not differ 
considerably from that of Base case. The analysis of production, consumption and price patterns in TP 
cases yields almost the same results (Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Main variables’ turning points and discrepancies from Base Case (BC) results 
 
Discovery rate Consumption rate Undiscovered 
reserves 
Proved 
reserves 
AWP 
Turning point Turning point 
Year Relative 
to BC 
              Main            
indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alternative 
Scenarios 
  
Cumulative 
value 
relative to 
BC 
Year Relative 
to BC 
Cumulative 
value 
relative to 
BC 
Cumulative 
value relative 
to BC 
Cumulative 
value 
relative to 
BC 
Time when 
AWP 
exceeds 0.9 
GBP/cm 
(which is 
roughly ten 
times the 
level of 
2005 gas 
price ) 
Price at 
the end of 
simulation 
(relative to 
BC) 
Base case (BC) 2006 --- --- 2000 --- --- --- --- 2012 --- 
Low taxation case 2006 +2% -0.27% 2000 -0.1% -0.4% -0.1% +0.5% 2013 -2.3% 
High taxation case 2006 -4.5% -1.7% 2000 +0.01% +0.3% +0.5% -1.1% 2012 -3.1% 
Advanced technology 
case 
2017 +99% +149% 2000 +0.2% +16.7% -12% +11% 2018 -74.8% 
Low demand case 2015 -7% +33% 2007 -27.6% -0.9% +17.2% +7.8% 2020 -41.5% 
High demand case 2003 +107% -6.3% 1998 +19.4% -13.7% -10.5% +16% 2005 +1400% 
 5.2 High and Low Demand cases 
The analysis of demand cases shows that the model is quite sensitive to initial demand conditions. 
In particular, the high demand case (HDC) shifts the peak of the discovery rate, so that it peaks three 
years earlier and was about 100% higher in value than in the Base case (table 2). The consequence of 
such a high rate of discoveries is a rapid increase in price due to the depletion effects on E&A drilling 
costs. In general, the HDC forces both production and consumption to peak earlier with higher values 
than in the Base case but shortens the overall lifetime of both production and consumption.  
Lower demand increases the RDR and thus discourages investment in E&A. As a result, the DR 
peaks nine years later at a relatively lower level than in the Base case. Production and consumption 
follows the same pattern as DR. This case leads consumption to peak seven years later at a 28% lower 
value than the Base case. In the how demand case (LDC) the price stays low. This is due to the fact that 
low demand has constrained the DR throughout the modelling period and thus the gas price is lower than 
it otherwise would have been. Although gas prices in the demand cases vary considerably, they have 
limited effects on cumulative gas consumption (see table 2) due to a relatively low elasticity of 
consumption.  
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Figure 20: Dynamics of AWP in alternative cases 
 
5.3 Advanced technology case 
The impact of better exploration and production technologies on consumption rate is limited in the 
short-term but has a considerable effect in the long run. The cumulative gas consumption in this case is 
about 150% higher in value than in the Base case (figure 21). In the long term, lower costs of exploration 
and production resulting from technological improvements increases the discovery rate, production and 
consumption rates compared with the other cases (see, e.g., figures 19 and 21). 
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Figure 21: Dynamics of CR in alternative cases 
 
Due to the long-term effects of technological improvements, the consumption peaked at the same 
time as in the Base case. The direct impact of improvements in exploration and production technology is 
lower cost and consequently lower gas prices. The overall impact of improvements in exploration and 
production technology is to extend the lifetime of gas reserves and postpone the depletion effects on costs 
considerably allowing gas usage to continue for a longer time. 
 
5.4 Rising gas import-dependence in UK 
Analysis of alternative policies indicates that the most effective policies for prolonging indigenous 
gas production and consumption are those dealing with demand side, but the optimal policy should be one  
that combines both supply and demand side measures. Continued demand growth, depletion of gas 
resources, and long delays in the implementation of energy policy raise the possibility of a significant gap 
between gas demand and indigenous production. Under these conditions, the UK might rely on massive 
gas imports to balance supply and demand during the coming decades. 
Figure 22 illustrates the results of the combined supply-demand policy (Supply-Demand case), 
which assumes: reduced demand (e.g. by successful implementation of energy efficiency policies), which 
would stabilise gas demand growth at 1% p.a.; and reduced taxation to encourage R&D in exploration 
and production technology. The result of the combined policy is that, in the long-term, gas imports will be 
minimal due to extension of the lifetime of indigenous gas production which is associated with reliability 
and secure supplies for domestic customers. Management of import-dependence thus should not be 
reduced to focus solely on the design of responses to the unreliability of exporting countries but rather 
should emphasise the development of a combination of external and internal policies. 
The size of the resource base in European countries such as the UK, Norway or Netherlands can 
only play a limited role in postponing the time when the EU would be heavily dependent on external gas 
resources. The only way to increase the reserve base is through technological advances, which in the past 
several decades has actually broadened the reserve base through improvements in recovery technologies 
(Butler, 2007). 
 
Figure 21: Dynamics of natural gas imports in alternative cases 
 
6. Conclusion 
As the UK becomes more dependent on natural gas imports, a new energy policy will be required. 
Efforts to design such a policy require long-range planning because of the lead times required for policies 
to have their full effect. For example, the growing gas import-dependence in the UK is a direct result of 
the policies adopted by successive governments during the past two decades e.g. those aimed at 
promoting the fastest possible exploitation of indigenous gas reserves and large-scale exports (Stern, 
2004). 
The model presented here could be useful for prediction purposes since it has shown minimal 
discrepancies with historical data of the main variables. The functional forms of the various assumptions 
made in this model are able to represent historical data and dynamic behaviours quite well, but there is no 
assurance that the same functional forms will be correct in the future. In any case, this type of model does 
offer a useful experimental tool for determining how various assumptions about physical, technological 
and economic factors affect patterns of growth or decline. 
By running different scenarios, several fundamental dynamic behaviours can be seen explicitly. For 
instance, the concept of exponential growth is very important for designing long-term energy policy since 
our analysis shows that supply policies (TP cases) alone cannot substantially postpone the discovery, 
production or consumption peak. We also found that main parameters, namely, exploration, production 
and consumption are quite sensitive to initial demand conditions. Postponing the onset of rising gas price 
can be achieved more effectively through efforts to reduce demand than through efforts directed at the 
supply-side.  Improvements in exploration and production technology can delay the peak time of 
exploration, production and consumption. The overall effects of technological improvements are an 
increase in reserve life-time, lower gas price and consequently prolonged gas usage.  
Nonlinear systems sometimes exhibit responses to policy changes that seem to support policy goals 
in the short term, but over the longer term, the system returns to its pre-policy-change state or produces an 
even worse situation. This reversion occurs when the system's feedback structure works to defeat the 
policy change designed to improve it (Sterman, 2000). A short-term policy of supply-side management, 
e.g. through various taxation policies, might exhibit policy resistance. For example, it is logical that the 
Low taxation policy should encourage more exploration and production of gas and therefore stimulate a 
higher consumption rate; but there were no substantial effects over the long-run, i.e. in the Low taxation 
case cumulative gas consumption is even less than that of the Base case. One explanation for the policy 
resistance could be the declining marginal rate of discovery which leads to higher cost, higher prices, and 
lower consumption over the long-term. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1: Main causal loops of the dynamic model of UK natural gas industry 
 
Exploration sector Production and 
consumption sector 
Demand and 
substitution 
sector 
Loop B1 Loop B2 Loop B3 Loop B4 Loop B5 Loop B6 
Undiscovered 
reserves; 
Fraction of 
undiscovered 
reserves 
remaining; 
Cost of 
E&A; 
Indicated 
discovery 
rate; 
Discovery 
rate; 
Undiscovered 
reserves. 
 
Undiscovered 
reserves; 
Fraction of 
undiscovered 
reserves 
remaining; 
Cost E&A; 
Industry’s ROI; 
Investment in 
E&A; 
Indicated 
discovery rate; 
Discovery rate; 
Undiscovered 
reserves. 
 
Proved 
reserves; 
Relative 
reserves 
demand ratio; 
Investment in 
E&A; 
Indicated 
discovery rate; 
Discovery 
rate; 
Proved 
reserves. 
Production 
rate; 
Relative 
reserves 
production 
ratio; 
Production 
cost; 
Industry’s 
ROI; 
Desired 
investment 
in 
production; 
Desired 
production 
rate; 
Production 
rate. 
 
Production 
rate; 
Proved 
reserves 
Relative 
reserve 
demand ratio 
Average 
wholesale 
price; 
Consumption 
rate: 
Production 
rate 
Relative reserve 
demand ratio; 
Average 
wholesale price; 
Share of other 
fuels in TPED; 
Natural gas 
demand; 
Relative reserve 
demand ratio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B: Model Equations 
 
Exploration Sector 
In order to explore the relationship between the cost of exploration drilling (COE&A) and depletion of 
undiscovered reserves (FURR), a regression was performed on 1987-1998 data for UK gas industry. The 
regression yielded7: 
( & ) 21.66 ( ) 4.5Ln COE A Ln FURR= − −                                                                                        (B.1) 
                               (4.4)               (0.26) 
R2=.731           SER=.44 
(B.2) and (B.3) show how COE&A is calculated. 
 
                                                                                                                               (B.2) 
& & &COE A COE AM ICOE A= ×                                                                                              (B.3) 
FURR – Fraction of Undiscovered Reserves Remaining (Dimensionless) 
UR – Undiscovered Reserves (Cubic meters) 
IUR – Initial value of Undiscovered Reserves (Cubic meters) 
COE&A – Cost of exploration and appraisal (GBP/cubic meter) 
COE&AM - Cost of exploration and appraisal multiplier (Dimensionless) 
ICOE&A – Initial cost of exploration and appraisal (GBP/cubic meter) 
 
The rate of gas discoverites is defined as follows: 
&
&
IE AIDR
COE A
=                                                                                                                             (B.4) 
( , 4.5)DR DELAY IDR=                                                                                                                 (B.5) 
IDR – Indicated discovery rate (Cubic meters/year) 
IE&A – Investment in exploration and appraisal (GBP/year) 
COE&A – Cost of exploration and appraisal (GBP/Cubic meter) 
DR – Discovery rate (Cubic meters/year) 
DELAY – Delay function 
4.5 – 4.5 years of delay in the results of IE&A drilling 
 
The derivation of investment in gas exploration and appraisal drilling is based on regressions8 
(equations B.6 and B.7) performed on 1987-1992 data for industry’s ROI, RRDR and percentage of sales 
invested in E&A (PSIE&A) (BP, 2007; DTI, 2007).  
                                                 
7 Throughout, the value in parentheses is the standard error.  For eqn. B.1, T and F statistics for this regression are significant 
at the 1 per cent level. 
URFURR
IUR
=
 ( & ) 1.04 ( ) 0.95Ln PSIE A Ln RRDR= − −                                                                                        (B.6) 
                           (0.14)               (0.019) 
R2=.97           SER=.036 
( & ) 0.68 ( ) 1.2Ln PSIE A Ln ROI= −                                                                                               (B.7) 
                           (0.1)               (0.05) 
R2=.956           SER=.04 
PRRDR NGDRRDR
NRDR NRDR
= =                                                                                                              (B.8) 
                                                                                                                                   (B.9) 
& &PSIE A ROIF RRDRF IPSIE A= × ×                                                                                     (B.10) 
& &IE A PSIE A SR= ×                                                                                                                 (B.11) 
RDR – Reserve-demand ratio (Years) 
PR- Proved reserves (Cubic meters) 
NGD – Natural gas demand (Cubic meters/year) 
RRDR – Relative reserve-demand ratio (Dimensionless) 
NRDR –Normal reserve-demand ratio (10 years) 
ROI – Industry’s return on investment (% per year) 
AWP – Average wholesale price (GBP/cubic meter) 
TUC – Total unit cost (GBP/cubic meter) 
PSIE&A – Percentage of sales invested in E&A (% per year) 
IPSIE&A – Initial percentage of sales invested in E&A (37% in 1987) (DTI, 2007) 
ROIF – ROI Factor (Dimensionless) 
RRDRF – RRDR Factor (Dimensionless) 
IE&A – Investment in exploration and appraisal (GBP/year) 
SR – Sales revenue (GBP/year) 
 
Production sector 
The functional relationship between production cost and relative reserve-production ratio (RRPR) was 
derived by performing regressions on 1987-2000 data for production cost (PC) and RRPR (BP, 2007; DTI, 
2007). Equations B.12-B.14 provide the regression results and indicate how PUC is computed: 
( ) 0.28 1.56 ( )Ln PC Ln RRPR= −                                                                                                   (B.12) 
                (0.036)      (0.134) 
R2=.92           SER=.11 
                                                                                                                                                                           
8 For eqn. B.6: T statistic is significant at the 1 per cent level and F statistic is significant at the 5 per cent level; For eqn. B.7: T 
statistic is significant at the 2.5 per cent level and F statistic is significant at the 5 per cent level 
PRRPR PRRRRPR
NRPR NRPR
= =                                                                                                            (B.13) 
IPC PCFPUC
PRR
×=                                                                                                                        (B.14) 
RPR – Reserve-production ratio (Years) 
PR – Proved reserves (Cubic meters) 
PRR –Production rate (Cubic meters/year) 
RRPR – Relative reserve-production ratio (Dimensionless) 
NRPR – “Normal” reserve-production ratio (12 years) 
PUC – Production unit cost (GBP/Cubic meter) 
IPC – Initial production cost (₤447 Million in 1987) 
PCF – Production cost factor (Dimensionless) 
 
In order to derive the functional relationship between return on investment (ROI) and investment in 
production (PSIP) a regression was performed on data for operating expenditures plus other costs related 
to production expansion and actual ROI. The result of this regression analysis is as follows9: 
( ) 0.88 ( ) 1.098Ln PSIP Ln ROI= −                                                                                                 (B.15) 
                     (0.24)            (0.15) 
R2=.82           SER=.1 
 
Equations (B.16) and (B.17) show how the variable ‘Desired Production Rate (DPR)’ is obtained. 
( & )DIP PSIP SR IE A= × −                                                                                                         (B.16) 
DIPDPR
PUC
=                                                                                                                                  (B.17) 
DIP – Desired investment in production (GBP/year) 
PSIP – Percentage of sales revenue invested in production (% per year) 
SR – Sales revenue (GBP/year) 
IE&A – Investment in exploration and appraisal (GBP/year) 
DPR – Desired production rate (Cubic meters/year) 
PUC – Production unit cost (GBP /Cubic meter) 
 
Functional relationship between price and relative reserve-demand ration (RRDR) is shown in (B.18)10. 
( ) 0.11 2.03 ( )Ln P Ln RRDR= −                                                                                                     (B.18) 
              (0.03)            (0.34) 
R2=.9           SER=.08 
                                                 
9 For eqn. B.15: T statistic and F statistic are significant at the 5 per cent level 
10 For eqn. B.18: T statistic and F statistic are significant at the 1 per cent level 
 The price of gas (AWP) is defined as follows: 
&TUC COE A PUC= +                                                                                                                 (B.19) 
3( , )STC SMOOTH TUC SD=                                                                                                       (B.20) 
AWP PF STC= ×                                                                                                                         (B.21) 
PF – Price factor (Dimensionless) 
AWP – Average wholesale price (GBP/cubic meter) 
TUC – Total unit cost (GBP/cubic meter) 
COE&A – Cost of exploration and appraisal (GBP/cubic meter) 
PUC – Production unit cost (GBP/cubic meter) 
STC – Smoothed total cost (GBP/cubic meter) 
SMOOTH3 – Third-order exponential smoothing function 
SD – Smoothing delay (Years) 
 
A delay in TUC is introduced (as indicated by B.20) because of the heterogeneous nature of the 
costs of gas. At the initial stage of a field’s development, gas is produced at lower prices than at later 
stages (because of the depletion effect on costs) (Naill, 1973). The length of the smoothing delay (SD) 
depends on the magnitude of the discovery and the production rate. New discoveries lead to depletion and 
hence increase the cost of future discovered gas. To reflect the increase in the cost of that particular 
amount of discovered gas the delay time should equal the RPR. When new discoveries exceed the 
production rate, RPR will increase and therefore, the cost of that particular amount of discovered gas will 
be high only after a period of time indicated by RPR. 
 
To validate the assumption regarding the relationship between price and consumption rate a 
regression was performed on 1987-2005 data for average gas price and consumption rate (BP, 2007; DTI, 
2007). We included a time variable in the regression to account for other effects on gas consumption, 
such as income effect. The regression11 yielded: 
 
( ) 2.56 0.42 ( ) 0.054( )Ln C Ln P t= − +                                                                                            (B.22) 
            (0.41)     (0.13)        (0.004) 
R2=.945           SER=.063 
 
(B.23) shows how consumption rate is derived.  
CR CF NGD= ×                                                                                                                             (B.23) 
CR – Consumption rate (Cubic meters/year) 
                                                 
11 For eqn B.22: T statistics and F statistic are significant at the 1 per cent level 
CF – Consumption factor (Dimensionless) 
NGD – Natural gas demand (Cubic meters/year) 
 
Production rate is derived as follows: 
min( , )PRR DPR CR=                                                                                                                     (B.24) 
PRR – Production rate (Cubic meters/year) 
DPR – Desired production rate (Cubic meters/year) 
CR – Consumption rate (Cubic meters/year) 
 
Demand projection and substitution sector 
Equations12 (B.25-B.28) show the result of regressions performed on 1976-2005 data for average 
gas price, coal, oil, nuclear and hydro energy demand. 
( ) 0.206 ( ) 0.046( ) 0.001Ln CS Ln P t= − −                                                                                           (B.25) 
                  (0.049)     (0.004)   (0.21) 
2=.917           SER=.089 
( ) 0.036 ( ) 0.004( ) 1Ln OS Ln P t=− − −                                                                                                 (B.26) 
                   (0.025)    (0.002) (0.11) 
R2=.64           SER=.046 
( ) 0.227 ( ) 0.017( ) 2.19Ln NS Ln P t= + −                                                                                             (B.27) 
              (0.069)          (0.005) (0.3) 
R2=.845           SER=.12 
( ) 0.151 ( ) 0.005( ) 4.4Ln HS Ln P t= − −                                                                                               (B.28) 
                  (0.067)     (0.005)  (0.29) 
R2=.25           SER=.12 
 
The calculation of gas demand is as follows: 
 NGD GSTPED TPED= ×                                                                                                          (B.29) 
expT TPEDGRTPED ITPED ×= ×                                                                                                     (B.30) 
1 ( )GSTPED CS OS NS HS= − + + +                                                                                       (B.31) 
expT CSGRCS CSF ICS ×= × ×                                                                                                      (B.32) 
expT OSGROS IOS ×= ×                                                                                                                  (B.33) 
                                                 
12 For eqn. B.25: T statistics and F statistic are significant at the 1 per cent level. For eqn. B.26: T statistics are significant at 
the 10% level and F statistic is significant at the 1 per cent level. For eqn. B.27: T statistics and F statistic are significant at the 
1 per cent level. For eqn. B.28: T statistic for price coefficient is significant at the 1% level; T statistic for time coefficient is 
insignificant; F statistic is significant at the 5 per cent level 
expT NSGRNS NSF INS ×= × ×                                                                                                       (B.34) 
expT HSGRHS IHS ×= ×                                                                                                                  (B.35) 
NGD – Natural gas demand (Cubic meters/Year) 
GSTPED – Gas share in total primary energy demand (Cubic meters/Year) 
TPED – Total primary energy demand (MTOE/year) 
ITPED – Initial total primary energy demand (207.4 MTOE or 230.4 BCM in 1987) 
TPEDGR – TPED growth rate (% per year) 
CS – Coal share in TPED (%) 
CSF – Coal substitution factor (Dimensionless) 
ICS – Initial coal share in TPED (35.5% in 1987) 
CSGR – Coal share growth rate (% per year) 
OS – Oil share in TPED (%) 
IOS – Initial oil share in TPED (36.3% in 1987) 
OSGR – Oil share growth rate is exogenously determined at -0.67% per year13 
NS – Nuclear share in TPED (%) 
NSF – Nuclear substitution factor (Dimensionless) 
INS – Initial nuclear share in TPED (6.02% in 1987) 
NSGR – Nuclear share growth rate (% per year) 
HS – Hydro share in TPED (%) 
IHS – Initial hydro share in TPED (0.675% in 1987) 
HSGR – Hydro share growth rate is exogenously determined at 0.49% per year14 
T – Time (years) 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Based on  data from 1976-2005 average oil demand in TPED exhibited a decline of 0.67% per year (DTI, 2006b) 
14 Based on  data from 1976-2005 average hydro energy demand in TPED grew at 0.49% per year (DTI, 2006b) 
